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MANDATORY LABELING OF BIOENGINEERED FOODS
Andrew Wiliams*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under 7 U.S.C. § 1639b, food products containing
bioengineered organisms must be clearly identified as such on
their labeling or packaging. The statute, alternatively titled the
Establishment of National Bioengineered Food Disclosure
Standard ("NBFDS"), was made effective on July 29, 2016.
Notably, it will not be enforced until July 29, 2018. NBFDS was a
product of compromise after a similar piece of mandatory labeling
legislation, the Deny Americans the Right to Know ("DARK") Act
(i.e., H.R. 1599),' had already failed in the Senate.
The compromise weakened the labeling requirements
provided in NBFDS. First, Congress permitted labeling
exemptions for food products containing less than a certain
percentage of bioengineered parts.2 Strikingly, Congress
neglected to define the threshold percentage necessary to qualify
for the exemption. Second, animals that consume bioengineered
substances are not themselves considered bioengineered food or
organisms.3 Third, manufacturers are permitted to disclose the
required information by "text, symbol, or electronic or digital
link," 4 which even includes the use of QR codes (a machine-
readable code consisting of an array of black and white squares,
typically used for storing URLs or other information for reading
by the camera on a smartphone).5 However, the effectiveness of
* Andrew Williams, Staff Editor of the KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT.
RESOURCES L.; Degree in Agriculture Economics, 2012, University of Kentucky; J.D.
expected May 2018, University of Kentucky College of Law.
I Anna Roth, 5 Things to Know About the DARK Act, CIVIL EATS (Sept. 20,
2015), http://civileats.com/201 5/07/20/5-things-to-know-about-the-dark-act/
[bttps://perma.cclF3KM-57GY1.
2 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(b)(2)(B) (2016).
" § 1639b(b)(2)(A).
" § 1639b(b)(2)(D).
5 Dan Charles, Congress Just Passed a GMO Labeling Bill. Nobodv's Super
Happy About It, NPR (July 14, 2016, 5:34 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/07/14/486060866/congress-just-passed-a-gmo-
labeling-bill-nobodys-super-happy-about-it [https://perma.cc/HK4Z-PXCU].
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electronic disclosures are unknown and will require further study
by the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") which
was to begin no later than July 29, 2017.6 The factors that are to
be focused on when performing the study are:
The availability of wireless Internet or cellular
networks, the availability of landline telephones in
stores, challenges facing small retailers and rural
retailers, the efforts that retailers and other
entities have taken to address potential technology
and infrastructure challenges, and the costs and
benefits of installing in retail stores electronic or
digital link scanners or other evolving technology
that provide bioengineering disclosure
information.7
"If the [USDA] determines . . . that consumers while
shopping, would not have sufficient access to the bioengineering
disclosure through electronic or digital disclosure methods, the
Secretary, after consultation with food retailers and
manufacturers, shall provide additional and comparable options
to access the bioengineering disclosure."8
This Note contends that NBFDS should be repealed or not
enacted after review by the USDA. Part II includes a brief history
of the issues presented in this Note. After which, Part III argues
that the statute's express preemption clause does not have a
discernable intent from Congress and consequently will have no
effect on states that wish to legislate on bioengineered foods. Part
III also argues the statute will fail if the USDA does not conduct
the study as prescribed by Congress. Part IV argues that even if
the USDA conducts the study, it will still fail as a cost-benefit
analysis will show that the costs incurred will outweigh benefits
in the form of increased food prices to consumer, and other
various factors. Part V will look at individuals who reside in the
U.S. and either are or are on the brink of food insecurity, and the
6 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1).
7 § 1639b(c)(3)(A)-(E).
8 § 1639b(c)(4).
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possible effects on those individuals if this legislation is
implemented.
II. BRIEF HISTORY
With Congress' narrower definition of bioengineered foods,
NBDFS rejects "brute force" DNA replications and focuses only
on rDNA foods, which cannot be found naturally. To further
clarify, "rDNA techniques allow scientists to introduce genetic
traits from one species to another, a crossover that is impossible
through conventional breeding techniques."9
Congress has defined a bioengineered food as that which is
fit "for human consumption . . . [but] contains genetic material
that has been modified through in vitro recombinant
deoxyribonucleic acid ("rDNA") techniques; and for which the
modification could not otherwise be obtained through
conventional breeding or found in nature."10 This definition
includes terms used interchangeably with bioengineered foods
such as genetic engineering, genetic modification, and
biotechnology." As an alternative to the Congressional definition,
many experts provide that genetic modification is "any
intentional alteration to the genomes of living organisms,
whether [accomplished] with selection pressures over repeated
generations, ... hybridizing two different but related organisms, .
. . or by splicing new genes into the organism's genome."12 This
broader definition includes more types of genetic modifications,
from producing alcoholic beverages from yeast to producing
Penicillin from bacteria.13
Regardless of definition, proponents of bioengineered foods
often point to their economic and humanitarian benefits while
critics warn of their unknown consequences. Proponents argue
that bioengineering decreases the time needed to produce
beneficial mutations to the selected crops and no longer requires
9 Doug Farquhar & Liz Meyer, State Authority to Regulate Biotechnology Under
the Federal Coordinated Framework, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 439, 441 (2007).
1 § 1639
11 HENRY L MILLER & GREGORY CONKO, THE FRANKENFOOD MYTH: How
PROTEST AND POLITICS THREATEN THE BIOTECH REVOLUTION 3 (2004).
12 1d.
13 -1d.
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waiting for those mutations to occur naturally-a process which
could span millennia. Thus, both desired results and benefits are
realized more quickly.14 Such benefits include "increased
production of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in a world
rapidly depleted of its resources and where many people starve to
death."15 Moreover, "[t]his technology can develop strains of crops
that produce higher yields on marginal lands, allowing countries
to increase food production and crops to survive extreme weather
such as prolonged droughts."'6 Currently, up to 15 percent of
corn, globally known as maize, is lost per year to drought.1 7
However, this can be combated by modifying genes within the
crop which "can increase the plants' abiotic stress tolerance, or
rather, increase the plants' ability to prevent water loss to the
environment."1 8 Further, a meta-analysis comparing results from
147 different sources found that "[genetic modification]
technology adoption has reduced chemical pesticide use by 37
percent, increased crop yields by 22 percent, and increased
farmer profits by 68 percent."1 9
Alternatively, arguments advanced by critics of
bioengineered foods are typically concerned with how they may
negatively contribute to reduced human health, cross-
contamination, and environmental degradation.20 "In particular,
transgenic contamination threatens the preservation and
longevity of local conventional crops, organic crops, and wild
populations."21 "Additionally, many [genetically engineered] crops
are designed to tolerate herbicides, which contributes to the
development of 'superweeds' as well as increased levels of toxins
14 Id. at 442.
'5 Id.
17 Genetically Modifies Crops, MASS. INST. TECH.,
http://12.000.scripts.mit.edulmission2Ol7/geneticaly-modified-crops/ (last visited Dec. 31,
2016) [https://perma.cc/8M32-R9BD].
'Id.
is Wilhelm Klumper & Matin Qaim, A Meta-Analysis of the Impacts of
Genetically Modified Crops, PLOS (Nov. 3, 2014),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0111629#s5
[https://perma.cc/7EGA-DBB4].
20 Laura Murphy et al., Seeking Pure Fields: The Case Against Federal
Preemption of State Bans on Genetically Engineered Crops, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 503, 504
(2015).
21 Id
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in the environment that threaten human health and wildlife." 22
There is the additional fear that cross-pollination from
genetically engineered plants with other plants will introduce
genes into the human food chain that regulators have not
approved for human consumption.23
III. EXPRESS PREEMPTION
The federal preemption doctrine originates from the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.24 The doctrine "states
that federal laws 'shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding."'25 Federal regulations may preempt state law.2 6
Accordingly, courts are required to invalidate challenged state
laws to the extent they conflict with federal laws and
regulations.27 There are three ways courts exercise federal
preemption: express, field, and conflict preemption.28
"Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly
states, in the statute's language, the limits of state laws in the
regulated field." 29 When analyzing preemption issues, the U.S.
Supreme Court assumes that historic state powers are not to be
superseded by Federal law unless there is a clear and manifest
purpose of Congress to do so.s0 The legislative history behind the
NBFDS does not show a clear and manifest purpose of Congress.
It can best be told by the speech given by the Hon. Chris Van
Hollen, of Maryland, who rose reluctantly in opposition to the
bill:
[M1ost scientists agree that GMO seeds and foods
are safe for consumption. At the same time, a
majority of Americans have consistently stated that
2 Id. at 505.
2 Td. at 443.
24 Bruce Friedrich, Meat Labeling Through The Looking Glass, 20 ANIMAL L. 79,
83 (2013).
25 Id. at 83-84; U.S. CONST. art. VT, cl. 2.
a Murphy et al., supra note 23, at 508.
27 Friedrich, supra note 28, at 84.
2 Id.
* Farquhar & Meyer, s upra note 16, at 444.
'0 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
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they want to know if their food contains GMOs.
Supporters of more comprehensive food labeling
have argued that this bill contains large loopholes
that would keep many consumers in the dark.
Unfortunately, not a single hearing was held on
this bill to listen to the competing perspectives and
recommendations. I am also disappointed that on
such a controversial and important subject,
members were not given the opportunity to offer
any amendments.
I am concerned that a hastily written and passed
federal bill will now preempt state laws that seek
to provide their consumers with more
comprehensive and readily accessible information.
While I do not believe that an inconsistent
patchwork of individual state regulations is the
long term answer, I do believe we could improve on
the provisions of this bill (emphasis added).31
Subsequently, the Hon. Joseph Crowley voiced his support
of the bill while acknowledging its' shortcomings.32 He first
argued the bill established a national standard that would
preempt the patchwork of similar state and local laws. He then
stated that manufacturers would respond by working together to
create one uniform method for consumers to access the required
disclosures on their labels.33 However, Mr. Crowley's optimistic
presumption fails to provide mention of specific incentives that
would persuade competing manufacturers to collaborate.
Eleven days later, the bill became NBFDS. 34 Even where
"presumption against federal preemption of state law applies, it
will be overcome when a congressional purpose to preempt. . . [is]
clear and manifest."3 5 This seems to be satisfied under NBFDS.
The statute provides that no state, or political subdivision
thereof, may enact or continue to regulate foods in any manner
3i 162 CONG. REC. Ell51. (daily ed. July 18, 2016).
162 CONG. REC. E1.153 (daily ed. July 18, 2016).
33 Id.
3 7 U.S.C § 1639b (2016).
a Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3rd Cir. 2008).
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which would affect labeling or disclosure of "food [which] is
bioengineered or was developed or produced using bioengineering
. . . that is subject to the national bioengineered food disclosure
standard" unless it is identical to the statute.36 While the
language of the statute seems to clearly provide that states laws
cannot run contrary to its intent, the argument can be made,
based on legislative history, there is no clear and manifest
congressional purpose.
Even if the congressional intent prong of express
preemption fails, federal regulations enacted by the USDA
generally have the force of law.3 7 However, there are exceptions
to this rule. "When Congress has delegated the authority to
regulate a particular field to an administrative agency, the
agency's regulations issued pursuant to that authority have no
less preemptive effect than federal statutes, assuming those
regulations are a valid exercise of the agency's delegated
authority."38 Felner v. Tr-Union Seafoods, L.L.C. provides a
great example of what amounts to "a valid exercise of the
agency's delegated authority." In Fellner, the plaintiff brought a
claim within the state for failure to warn of the risks of mercury
in tuna.39 This claim was originally dismissed due to the Food &
Drug Administration's ("FDA") preemption clause.40  The
appellate court later ruled the claim was not preempted as the
FDA's actions on mercury in tuna were not rigorous enough to be
considered law-making, as they had not adopted a regulatory
scheme respecting mercury in tuna products of a type that could
conflict with, and thus preempt, state law claims.4' The FDA had
merely published advisory warnings, but this was not enough to
amount to granting deference to the agency for engaging in "law-
making."4 2 This principle holds true for all administrative
3 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(e).
7 See, e.g., Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (citations omitted);
New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988) ("The phrase 'Laws of the United States' [in the
Supremacy Clause] encompasses both federal statutes themselves and federal regulations
that are properly adopted in accordance with statutory authorization.").
8 Fellner, 539 F.3d at 243.
no See generally id.
41 Id. at 251-52.
42 Id.
5632016-2017
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agencies. If the USDA fails to take appropriate actions when
creating or implementing the regulations controlling
bioengineered labeling, it may not rise to the level of law-making
and would not preempt state regulation or state claims.
To rise to level of lawmaking, the USDA must begin their
study by July 29, 2017, and has until July 29th, 2018, to enact the
mandatory disclosure to those who are affected.43 Should the
USDA fail to begin the study within a reasonable time or fail to
go through some reasonable process to be considered law-making,
then it would likely be found to not meet the fairness and
deliberation requirements for their actions to be a binding federal
law."
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY LABELING FOR
BIOENGINEERED FOODS
A. Introduction
The full implementation of NBFDS hinges on the USDA
performing a cost-benefit analysis. The statute provides five
factors to be considered when performing the study of electronic
or digital link disclosure. While only one of those factors explicitly
states that there must be a cost-benefit analysis of installing
electronic or digital link scanners in retail stores, the other
factors are impliedly included in the last factor.45 However,
Congress has too narrowly defined the mandate of the USDA by
only requiring the agency to perform a cost-benefit analysis on
the retail side. A "cost-benefit analysis is an analytic procedure
which estimates the net economic value of a given policy or
project. It converts all costs and benefits into a monetary metric
and then measures whether the benefits outweigh the costs."4 6
The procedural steps behind a cost-benefit analysis are: (1) to
hold all constraints as given and ask if the policy change is for
43 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(a).
4 Friedrich, supra note 28, at 1.02.
5 7 U.S.C § 1639b.
6 Tyler Cowen, Using Cost-Benefit Analysis to Review Regulation 1 (1998),
https://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/faculty%20pages/Tyler/Cowen%20on%20cost%2
Obenefit.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2ZB-3ALX].
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the better; (2) to specify all relevant benefits and costs of that
policy; (3) to measure the costs and benefits in monetary terms;
and (4) to net the costs against the benefits.4 7 It is impossible to
contain a cost-benefit analysis to one section of the supply chain,
in this case the retailers, as there are causal effects that ripple
out to all participants when considering food, which is such a
basic resource of life. To contain the analysis to only retailers is
naive, if not impossible.
B. Economic Analysis
The use of economic analysis as a method to create and
interpret law by judges has been a controversial issue since
Richard Posner first published his book Economic Analysis in
Law in 1972.48 According to Posner, the use of economics in the
courtroom allows the science of rational choice in a world where
resources are limited in comparison to what people want.49
Posner states that the three fundamental principles of economics
are: "the inverse relation between price charged and quantity
demanded; the presumption that all consumers and sellers try to
maximize utility; and that resources tend to gravitate toward
their most valuable uses in a free market."50
There are two main approaches in applying economic
analysis to the law. The first is the positive approach, which is
objective and fact based.5 1 Additionally, a positive science is not
content with trying to state the facts as they are, but one that
uses and relies on accepted scientific methods that are
repeatable, consistent, and can be tested in the negative.52 The
second is the normative approach, which is subjective and value
4 Id.
48 Larry Chubb, Economic Analysis in the Courts: Limits and Constraints, 64
IND. L.J. 769, 769 (1989) (emphasis added).
SI1d. at 771.
5 Id.
51 Amy Fontinelle, What is the Difference Between Positive and Normative
Economics., INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 20, 201.6),
http://www.investopedia.comlasklanswers/12/difference-between-positive-normative-
economics.asp [https://perma.cc/YT3V-2STT].
2 See Fred S. McChesney, Positive Economics and all That-A Review of the
Economic Structure of Corporate Law by Frank I Easterbrook & Daniel R. Rischel, 61
GEO. L. REV. 272 (1992).
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based.53 Like positive economic analysis, normative economic
analysis must be internally consistent and use accepted economic
principles.54 However, normative economics are disfavored
because the requirements to prove a normative model are too
lax.5 5 Internal consistency and adherence to accepted economic
principles do not impose many burdens, and are almost
unassailable, as the proponent can make any assumptions they
need to fit their cause.56 The drawback to a positive analysis are
the amount of resources required to complete a study and the
difficulty sometimes associated with placing a dollar value on
costs and benefits.5 7
i. Varying methodologies in positive economic analysis
Three of common positive economic approaches used when
analyzing repercussions from policy changes are the: cost
accounting approach, equilibrium displacement model, and
computable general equilibrium model. The simplest cost-benefit
analysis would be an economic cost accounting approach. This
approach simply sums the anticipated costs on the proposed
changes over a baseline level of production and consumption.5 8
Though it may be appropriate for initial costs, the accounting
approach is disfavored as a primary model because it does not
consider how prices or quantities may react to those increased
costs.59 There are two alternative methods for performing an
economic analysis that are more comprehensive, and therefore
preferable.
The first alternative is the equilibrium displacement
model ("EDM"). EDMs are basically "logarithmic equations
characterizing comparative statistics of a system of equations
describing movement from one equilibrium to another resulting
' Fontinelle, supra note 54.
McChesney, supra note 55.
55 Jd.
5
6 Id.
57 Richard Whisnatt & Diane Dewitt Cherry, Economic Analysis or Rules:
Devolution, Evolution, and Realism, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 693, 726 (1.996).
5 Economic Analysis of Country of Origin ofLabelng, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. 4 (Apr.
2015), https://www.usda.gov/oce/economics/reports/COOLReportToCongress.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9J8H-F3EB].
59 Id.
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from a change in one or more of the parameters of the equation
system."" More simply put, EDMs attempt to predict the
cumulative effect of a change in a set of parameters, in this case a
labeling policy change, but is not confined to a simplistic linear
projection. The simplest example of an EDM is a derivation
function when one is trying to solve where equilibrium demand
equals equilibrium supply.6' This basic EDM takes it a step
further than simply trying to solve where the equilibrium price
would be given a static supply and demand, and tries to describe
equilibrium displacement for a single good in a market by
focusing on the relative change of multiple variables, such as
changes in demand, supply, market equilibrium price, or the
price elasticity of supply or demand.62 To fully understand how
this model is used, EDMs in vertical industries must be observed.
Many products supplied in the agricultural industry are
homogeneous in nature, and the supply chain for these products
has been consolidated greatly over the past 100 years-creating a
vertical industry-to realize greater farm-to-table margins at
each step of the supply process.6 3 "A vertical [industry] is a group
of companies that serve each other's specialized needs and that
do not serve a broader market."64 The first example of how EDMs
apply to vertical industries relates to a study focused on an
"analysis of the retail-farm price ratio," with a prediction on the
effects of increased or decreased consumer demand, increased or
decreased farmer supply, and the effects of supply side marketing
on the retail-farm price ratio.65 The results revealed that in a
vertical industry such as agriculture, vegetables carry a price
elasticity of demand of .54.66
6o JAYSON L. LUSK & JUTTA ROOSEN, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS
OF FOOD CONSUMPTION AND POLICY 292-93 (2011),
https://books.google.com/books?id=TQ4oAAAAQBAJ&pg-PA305&1pg-PA305&dq=define+
muth+EDM+in+vertical+industries&source=bl&ots=Rfeonma79&sig-NOVEFGberp5e
QJNnO2AsOfLsU&hl-en&sa=X&ved=OahUKEwinjc6di7_RAhUiJsAKHVrTDBwQ6AETH
DAA#v-onepage&q&f-false [https://perma.cc/W6G8-HZYJI.
61 Id. at 295.
62 &d
6" See generally Robert J. Myers et al., A Century of Research on Agricultural
Markets, 92 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 376 (2010).
C Vertical Market, Investopedia,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/verticalmarket.asp (last visited Sep. 2, 2017).
G' LUSK & ROOSEN, supra note 63, at 305-06.
; Id. at 307.
5672016-2017
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Price elasticity of demand is the "measure of the
relationship between a change in the quantity demanded of a
particular good and a change in its price."6 7 The range for price
elasticity of demand can range from zero to boundless. When the
price elasticity of demand for a good is zero, then regardless of
what the price change is, the demand for the good stays
constant.6 8 If the price elasticity of demand is 1, then the good is
called "unit elastic", which means that the percent change of
demand equals the percent change in price.6 9 If the price
elasticity of demand is a value greater than 1, then demand is
affected downward to a much larger degree than the percent
change in the price of the good.70 This has been a relatively stable
ratio throughout the years, with recent data showing a price
elasticity of demand for vegetables at .58.71 We will explore this
concept further when comparing the Country of Origin Labeling
("COOL") Act to the mandatory bioengineered food labeling act
this note covers. This was the preferred methodology performed
by the USDA when analyzing a similar issue under the COOL
Act.72
An alternative analysis could be performed using a
computable general equilibrium ("CGE") modeling approach. This
model is similar to EDM, as it allows "prices and quantities for
affected sectors . . . to adjust to higher costs of production."73 The
CGE model follows the basic principles of economics which,
assuming all other variables are constant, states that demand
decreases as prices increase.74 Unlike an EDM, CGE models allow
other sectors in the economy, as a whole, to respond to changes in
a- Price Elasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/priceelasticity.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2017)
[https://perma.cclS7BM-3PZY].
(3 Id.
ClId.
Id.
71 See Tatiana Andreyeva et al., The Impact of Food Prices on Consumption: A
Systematic Review of the Research on the Price Elasticity of Demand for Food, 100 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 21.6 (Feb. 2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2804646/
[https://perma.cc/WH8F-UA3A].
72 U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., supra note 61, at 3-4.
73 Id.
71 I~d
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other areas of the economy.7 5 One example of this is the thought
that retailers who incur higher labor costs from increased
labeling requirements would therefore pay higher wages to their
employees, who would then spend their increased wages on other
goods or services in the economy.7 6 Essentially, "the CGE
approach provides estimates for a longer run time frame to a new
regulation such as COOL. Those economic impacts would
typically be smaller than those developed from partial
equilibrium approach (PE) such as the EDM models, which
consider a fraction of the economy."77
While it would generally seem preferable to calculate a
CGE instead of an EDM, that is not the case here. A CGE is a
great tool for looking at impacts on other sectors of the economy
when there is a "shock" to the affected market.78 CGE models are
also great at tracking the impacts of changes in consumer income
and provide the flexibility needed to handle sweeping policy
issues, such as a mandatory labeling law.79 However, the analysis
and data collecting required to compute a CGE are time and
resource consuming. Conversely, an EDM requires fewer
resources because it does not analyze the entire economy but
focuses on the specific market at hand. Findings show that when
using both models to study a food supply chain, there is little to
no statistical significance between the results calculated.80 If the
comparative empirical results of an EDM are similar to those of a
CGE model, then it would maximize efficiency by choosing the
model that requires the least amount of resources. Consequently,
here, an EDM should be applied.
76 Id.
77 Id.
71 Dhazn Gillig & Bruce A. McCarl, Introduction to Computable General
Equilibirum Model, DEP'T AGRIC. ECON. TEX. A&M UNIV.,
http://agecon2.tamu.edu/people/faculty/mccarl-bruce/685/topic1-introcge.pdf (last visited
Jan. 13, 2017) [https://perma.c/KM6G-GH4M1.
8 See generally Sherman Robinson et al., Comparing CGE and PE Supply-Side
Specifications in Models of the Global Food System (2013),
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/6530.pdf (last visited Jan. 13,
2017) [https://perma.ce/33CB-P6CC].
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i. Country of Origin Labelng (COOL) as a comparative
framework
BRIEF HISTORY
The U.S. published its COOL rule on January 15, 2009,
which became effective on March 16, 2009.81 "COOL is a labeling
requirement that applies to retailers and their immediate
suppliers."82 The legislation further required retailers to inform
consumers of where certain products originated.83 While the
USDA study mainly focused on beef, pork, and chicken markets,
other products, such as nuts and perishable agricultural
commodities, are also subject to the COOL Act. 84
The underlying basis for enacting the mandatory COOL
Act seems to be protectionist; a desire to give domestic laborers,
such as farmers and other similarly situated agricultural
entrepreneurs a competitive advantage.85 Similarly, NBFDS
seems to exist for the "protection" of the nation's health, giving a
competitive advantage to farmers and retailers who opt to not
grow or use bioengineered foods.
COMPARING COOL & NBFDS
Given the similar nature of implementation and
methodology, both acts will have similar economic repercussions
on the economy. COOL and NBFDS share several similarities:
both require retailers to label certain commodities sold to
consumers while allowing exemptions to "establishments such as
restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, food stands, bars, taverns,
lounges, and delicatessens";86 and both laws were enacted as
protection measures, albeit from slightly different problems. That
a U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., supra note 61, at 1.
Id. at 8.
8 Id.
See generally U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., supra note 61. (referring to the "Economic
Analysis of Country of Origin Labeling") [hereinafter Economic Analysis].
- See generally Peter Chang, Country of Origin Labeling: History and Public
Choice Theory, 64 FOOD DRUG L.J. 693 (2009).
86 Country of Ongin Labeling: Just the Facts, AVERY DENNISON 1 (Jan. 2009),
https://www.foodprocessing.comlassets/wp-downloads/pdflAvery-whitepaper.pdf
[https://perma.ccl4PMX-8GD5].
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is, COOL was enacted in an effort to protect the local economy
while NBFDS was enacted in the effort to protect Americans
health.
However, the main difference between the two are the
permitted labeling methods. The COOL Act requires labeling to
be accurate and specific while holding the retailer responsible for
providing the country of origin information to consumers.87 It also
allows an exhaustive list of acceptable labels, including: labels,
placards, stamps, stickers, twist ties, bands, signs, and pin tags."
As previously covered, NBFDS allows retailers to disclose
information by "text, symbol, or electronic or digital link."89 While
the COOL Act requires labeling with clear and prominent
disclosures, NBFDS allows manufacturers to "hide" information
about their product containing bioengineered food behind
inconspicuous QR codes. However, while the method of labeling
differs, it is important to note that both laws require a physical
label which will increase costs for the entire supply chain:
farmers, producers, and consumers.
ECONOMIC IMPACT: LEARNING FROM COOL
A congressional report, on the implementation of COOL,
found that costs would increase throughout the supply chain for
commodities covered by the statute. "To enable retailers to
provide verifiable COOL information to their customers,
information must flow down the entire production and marketing
chain from farmers and ranchers to packers and processors to
wholesalers and retailers."90 While the wording of COOL does not
suggest that its impact would be felt beyond retailers and their
direct suppliers, the congressional report recognized that the
shock to the market would reach farmers and consumers as
well.91 This is directly comparable to NBFDS, where the cost-
benefit analysis states on its face that it should only look at the
impact to retailers. This is untenable. The costs cannot be fully
a Id. at 3.
8 Id.
- 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(b)(2)(D) (2016).
U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., supra note 61, at 8.
See generally id.
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absorbed by the producer, and should tell us that at least some of
these costs will be borne by subsequent links in the supply chain
or market. Specifically, the study states:
The out-of-pocket costs that each entity in the
supply chain must incur to implement COOL paint
only part of the picture in terms of costs to the
industry. Because of the interaction of supply and
demand relationships at different levels in the
supply chain, some of the marginal costs incurred
by an individual producer, packer, or retailer may
be passed up and down in the form of higher and
lower prices. . .
An EDM is most likely the preferred cost-benefit analysis
method. The EDM analysis in the COOL congressional report
found that, absent an increase in consumer demand, industry
compliance would lead to increased production, processing, and
marketing costs, resulting in economic losses to producers,
packers, retailers, and consumers.92 Consequently, these
conditions would shrink the overall industry, as fewer products
would be available at higher prices.93 These consequences of the
COOL Act would similar occur with the enforcement of NBFDS
model that is strikingly similar to the COOL Act.
First, the price increases that producers would have to
impose under NBFDS would not offset the loss in quantity
demanded. As projected under the COOL report, two out of the
three studied industries would lose roughly $897 million over a
10-year timespan on the supply side, with retailers absorbing
roughly 54 percent of the losses incurred.94 The total loss to the
studied industry was approximately $832 million.95 This is
explained by the supply curve shifting left due to the increased
costs of production, meaning there were reductions in quantities
produced and an increase in the price demanded.96 Similarly,
92 Id at 9.
SId. at 66.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 65.
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Congress has asked the USDA to perform a cost-benefit analysis
to retailers to calculate the impact of implementing an almost
identical scheme.
With the schemes being so similar the results would likely
be the same. Enforcing the COOL Act requires information not
only about a product's country of origin, but also that product's
subsequent movement. This requires original producers, such as
farmers, to keep extensive verified records, which increases
administrative costs. Similarly, NBFDS will undoubtedly cause
administrative costs to increase due to its' requirement of greater
record keeping. However, it is impossible to precisely predict
future administrative costs because Congress did not define the
percentage of bioengineering necessary for a modified food to
qualify as such. If they require disclosure for any presence of
bioengineered foods, then costs will be high. Conversely, if they
require a label only for foods that are 100 percent bioengineered,
then there will be essentially no costs and NBFDS will basically
have no impact. Given the similarities between the two laws, it is
highly likely we will see losses in the market due to increased
supplier costs without a significant increase in consumer
demand.
Second, given the rules of economics, if consumers demand
disclosure of products containing bioengineered food then
markets will voluntarily respond accordingly. It has been argued
by opponents of mandatory labeling that labels are unnecessary,
costly, and are ignored by consumers. Simultaneously,
proponents argue labels help consumers save money, avoid
serious risks, and protect third parties.97 Proponents of
mandatory labeling further state when there is asymmetric
information in which the consumers have less power or
information, mandatory labeling might overcome a collective
action problem.98 However, in many cases, we would expect
producers to voluntarily offer information desired by consumer.99
9 Cass R. Sunstein, On Mandatory Labeling, With Special Reference to
Genetically Modified Foods, U. PA. L. REV. 6 (forthcoming 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2824461 [https://perma.cclK8Q3-
AXCR].
-Id. at 7.
* See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information,
24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 502 (1981).
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According to Cass. R. Sunstein, the most cited legal scholar in
recent years,100 producers will voluntarily label their products as
non-bioengineered if such demand exists.
Assume that consumers are willing to pay $10 for
genetically modified salmon and $20 for salmon if it
is not genetically modified. Further assume that
genetically modified salmon costs $5 to produce,
whereas non-GM salmon costs $7 to produce.
Finally, assume that, initially, half the salmon on
the market is genetically modified and half is not.
Without any labeling, the consumer would not
know what kind of salmon she is buying and would,
therefore, be willing to pay $15 (= 0.5*$10 +
0.5*$20). This state of (consumer) ignorance
benefits the producers of GMO salmon and harms
the producers of non-GM salmon. But this state of
ignorance is not an equilibrium. The non-GM
sellers will voluntarily add a "No GMOs" label, so
that they can charge $20, rather than $15 per
salmon (as long as the cost of adding such a label is
less than $5 per salmon). The GM salmon will not
be labeled, but GMlabelng would not be necessary
- rational consumers would infer that non-labeled
salmon is genetically modified. As Bar-Gill and
Board explain, "An implication of this result is that
mandatory disclosure of product-attribute
information is often unnecessary." 10
Consumers willing to pay premiums for products not
containing GMO's incentivize producers to voluntarily engage in
that behavior for profit-maximizing reasons. The behavior of local
grocers confirms this. The Non-GMO Project has been applying
their "butterfly" stamp of approval to products that have been
M) Brian Leiter, Top Ten Law Faculty (by area) in Scholarly Impact, 2009-2013,
BRIAN LEITER'S L. SCH. RANKINGS (June 11, 2014),
http://www.1eiterrankings.com/faculty/2014_scholarlyimpact.shtml
[https://perma.cclNQ6R-RDC6].
101 Sunstein, supra note 99, at 8 (emphasis added).
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verified to be GMO-free since 2010.102 The Non-GMO Project has
recognized at least 3,022 different brands that are distributed to
2,430 participating retailers, which are easily searchable online,
for consumers who are concerned about purchasing foods free of
GMOs.03 The fact that many producers are voluntarily offering
this information, usually at a cost, suggests that there is not a
market failure via asymmetrical information. Accordingly,
implementing NBFDS would simply increase costs while
benefiting very few. Those desiring disclosure of bioengineered
foods are already receiving it voluntarily from producers, while
those who are indifferent to bioengineered foods are free to buy
lower cost products if they please.
Third, we must recall the price elasticity of demand that is
currently .58 for vegetables. With an increase of production costs
in implementing the new labels, the new additional costs would
trickle down the supply chain. This would in turn be reflected in
higher retail prices, thus increasing the price elasticity of demand
ratio. Recall, "price elasticity of demand is a term in economics often
used when discussing price sensitivity."" "When the value of elasticity is
greater than 1, it suggests that the demand for the good or service is
affected by the price. A value that is less than 1 suggests that the demand is
insensitive to price." 05 While the ratio is currently below one,
showing the market is somewhat inelastic, the ratio is moving in
the wrong direction. An increase in the price elasticity of demand
would mean consumers are more willing to switch to other
products in response to new higher prices, which would
effectively shrink the market.
Recalling the COOL study reported to Congress, it also
found that there was a disconnect between consumers words and
actions; consumers indicated interest in the COOL information
but this additional information did not increase demand for the
products.06 The passing of NBFDS clearly shows that some
'0 History NON-GMO PROJECT, http://www.nongmoproject.orglabout/history/
(last visited Jan. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/85C8-JGFYI}.
103 Verified Products, NON-GMO PROJECT, bttp://www.nongmoproject.org/find-
non-gno/verified-products/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4SBE-BX2Q].
I0 Price Elasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/elasticity.asp (last viewed Sep. 4, 2017).
05 Id.
10 U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., supra note 61, at 8.
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consumers desire to know if their food contains bioengineered
food. However, to be effective, "the label must be clear, concise,
and informative."0 7 If the label is misread or misunderstood, the
consumer will make uniformed decisions, which may increase
search and information costs.10 8 In the current structure under
NBFDS, manufacturers could require consumers to scan a QR
code by smart-phone, or equivalent technology, before they see
the actual disclosure. This process inherently hinders consumers
in gaining access to clear, concise, or informative statements
about foods containing bioengineered parts. The placement of a
QR code would actually undermine the intent of the law, making
information available consumers who demand it.
Given these increased costs, NBFDS could be valuable if
the benefits are large enough to outweigh the costs. The COOL
study had conflicting views as to whether Americans valued
origin labeling.1 0 9 However, the study did state that consumer
preference research indicated consumers may be willing to spend
more for domestic than foreign products.1 10 This was proven false.
A 2013 post-evaluation of meat consumption patterns found that
even after the implementation of COOL, there was no evidence
that demand for the domestic meat products increased.
Currently, 66 percent of Americans favor the mandatory labeling
of foods while only about 40 percent say the presence of a
bioengineered food is important."' This disconnect seems to
follow the same pattern recognized in the COOL report; most
people claim to care about the presence of bioengineered foods,
but do not put their money where their mouth is.
While Congress has called for the USDA to perform a cost-
benefit analysis, they did not specifically state the preferred
method. The economic cost-accounting approach is too simplistic
i0 Elise Golan et al., Economics ofFood Labeling, Agricultural Economic Report
No. 793, U.S. DEP'T AGRIc. 17-18 (2000),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/aer793/18885_aer793.pdf
[https://perma.ccAJlMK6-27KC1.
In Id. at 108.
10 U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., supra note 61, at 33.
I Mo Id.
I OIIMO foods: Most Americans want labeling, though don't care about eating
genetically modified food, pool finds, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
http://www.oregonlive.com/today/index.ssf/2015/01/gmo_foodsmost-americans-want.html
(last updated Jan. 13, 2015) [https://perma.cclFC5P-FC2Z}.
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and only captures the upfront costs while ignoring future
repercussions. A CGE model consumes more resources than
necessary for significantly similar results to an EDM. Thus, the
best approach to perform a cost-benefit analysis is an EDM. An
EDM allows one to measure the ripple effects of implementing a
proffered change while isolating specific markets and conserving
resources. In comparing the COOL Act and NBFDS, it is
apparent they have similar goals to be achieved by similar
processes. In 2015, The USDA reported an EDM study to
Congress which spoke to the effects of implementing COOL in the
state of the then economy. It was found that implementation
costs would outweigh any subsequent benefits. The study
particularly noted the costs that would be added to supply side.
Interestingly, while consumers said they would prefer to know
where their food products originated, it was found to have no
effect at the point of sale, and purchase patterns remained static.
Given the similarities of the goals and procedures of the two laws,
it seems to support that NBFDS will reach the same conclusions
as found in COOL. For these reasons, the NBFDS will likely fail
if or when the USDA conducts the required analysis.
V. FOOD INSECURITY: RAMIFICATIONS OF PRICIER FOOD
The USDA defines food insecurity as a lack of access to
enough food for an active, healthy life of all members of a
household.112 "Food insecurity is a serious public health problem
associated with poor cognitive and emotional development in
children and with depression and poor health in adults."11 3
"Further, food insecurity has been associated with . . . adolescent
suicidal ideation. Even the mildest form of food insecurity is
associated with risk of poor cognitive, social, and emotional
development of children younger than 3 years."114 Currently,
112 Hunger Study Finds Food Insecurity Levels Remain Historically High, KY.
DEP'T AGRIC., https://www.kyagr.com/Kentucky-AGNEWS/2016/Hunger-study-finds-food-
insecurity-levels-remain-historically-higb.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2017)
[bttps://perma.cc/47K4-QQ73].
11 Mariana Chilton & Donald Rose, A Rights-Based Approach to Food Insecurity
in the United States, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1203 (2007),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2696644/ [https://perma.cc/PY4Q-YLP8].
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Kentucky has a food insecurity incidence of roughly 17 percent;
slightly higher than the national average of 15 percent.1 15 Food
insecurity is an issue that exists in every county within
Kentucky.1 1 6 The percentage of people who face food insecurity
within in each county ranges from a maximum of 22.8 percent to
a minimum of 9 percent.1 17 Perhaps even more shocking is that
children suffer from higher rates of food insecurity in Kentucky,
hovering around 22 percent.118While current Kentucky food
insecurity rates are lower than the 2011 average, it is still higher
than the pre-Great Recession rates.119
The two major reasons why food insecurity rates have
remained high since the Great Recession are due to the effects of
higher inflation and higher relative food prices. "Inflation is the
rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is
rising and, consequently, the purchasing power of currency is
falling."1 20 NBFDS will have little to no effect on inflation and is
consequently not contemplated when analyzing how the
implementation of NBFDS may increase food insecurity.
Conversely, there is a strong correlative as well as causal
connection between the implementation of NBFDS and increased
food price and food insecurity.
When the USDA performed a linear regression analysis 21
on the effects of unemployment rates, inflation, and food prices,
they found that a 1 percent increase in the relative price of food
contributed to a .583 percent increase in food insecurity.122 This
115 Ky. DEP'T AGRIC., supra note 113.
1 16 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id
120 Inflation, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ilinflation.asp
(last viewed Jan. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/DMF9-2ZN8].
12i What is Linear Regression?, STAT. SOLUTIONS (2017),
http://www.statisticssolutions.com/what-is-linear-regression/ ("Linear regression is the
most basic and commonly used predictive analysis. Regression estimates are used to
describe data and to explain the relationship between one dependent variable and one or
more independent variables. It can be used to forecast effects or impacts of changes. That
is regression analysis helps us to understand how much the dependent variable will
change, when we change one or more independent variables.") [https://perma.cc/XVS8-
RFSM].
122 Mark Nord et al., Prevalence of US. Food Insecurity is Related to Changes in
Unemployment, Inflation, and the Price of Food, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. 11 (June 2014),
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coefficient was higher than both unemployment rates and
inflation which suggests a stronger link between food insecurity
and food price than any other variable.123 NBFDS will increase
the cost of producing food. This will lead to higher prices of food
products, as food producers either cannot or will not absorb these
additional costs. It is uncertain to what extent food prices will
increase because we do not know how many products will be
affected until the law has been fleshed out. Regardless, any
additional costs incurred by consumers through mandatory labels
for bioengineered food will not only lead to more hungry
Kentuckians, but Americans at large.
The ultimate question is whose interests are more
deserving of protection? As Congress believes, there is a strong
belief their constituents want to know when their food contains
bioengineered food. Alternatively, implementing mandatory
labeling laws will affect those already living on the margin, and
will push once food secure individuals towards food insecurity,
and ultimately malnutrition. The law should implement
voluntary instead of mandatory compliance. It will not lower or
raise the cost of food and thus maintain the status quo.
Companies who want to realize premiums on foods that are free
of bioengineered food will still be allowed to market them as such.
People who attach value to consuming bioengineered-free food
and are willing to pay the included premium will still have plenty
of options available to them. Most importantly, though, we would
not be pushing more families towards food insecurity who are
unable to otherwise shift their consumption. There have not been
any sound scientific studies that show genetically modified
organisms pose any health risks to people. It seems egregious to
harm the poorest in this country for an imagined benefit. For
policy reasons alone, Congress should repeal this law.
VI. CONCLUSION
NBFDS should be found invalid at the federal preemption
level, fail at the cost-benefit analysis level, or be repealed for
policy reasons. There is no intent discernable when it passed
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdos/publications/errl67/48167-errl67.pdf?v--418
2 8
[https://perma.cc/9WX3-URRD].
123 Id
5792016-2017
580 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. Vol. 9 No. 3
Congress, outside a belief that people wanted it. It also passed
without a single hearing being held for competing perspectives.
There is also the probability of inaction from the USDA which
would be an alternative ground for showing the lack of
preemption. Next, even if the bill is found to preempt state laws
and regulations, the law will likely fail under the EDM cost-
benefit analysis. If the USDA conducts the study, similarly
structured to the COOL Act, it will likely play out in a similar
fashion. The parameters are distinctly similar with the same
effects on the market, on both the supply and demand side. There
will surely be additional costs passed from suppliers to consumers
with no offsetting effect from the demand side to supply. When
the study of the cost-benefit analysis is finally presented to
Congress unfavorably, the discussion surrounding the mandatory
labeling law should be ended and the law left unimplemented.
Lastly, if Congress somehow finds that the law is not preempted
and the benefits outweigh the costs, then it should still be
repealed based on policy grounds. The nation is currently
experiencing food insecurity levels that remain higher than those
measured during the Great Recession. Implementing this law
will only drive more Americans to hunger for no reason other
than a misguided effort by Congress. To push marginalized
families further into poverty with a law that offers no clear
benefits is reckless and inhumane. When the benefits can only be
recorded in a ledger, but the costs can be heard in the rumbling of
a hungry child's stomach, humanity must conquer rushed
legislation.
